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Introduction
What do Human Resource Management (HRM) decisions contribute to
organizational objectives? Are the organizational investments in HRM
programs (such as pay for knowledge, enhanced employee benefits, training,
staffing, and employee involvement) justified by their returns? Since
labor costs can exceed fifty percent of total operating expenses (Milkovich
& Boudreau, 1988), are the human resources being managed with the same
accountability, rationality and care as the plant, equipment and marketing
resources? Is such management even possible with human resources, or are
the "people issues" facing organizations simply too ill-defined and
unpredictable to be managed systematically?
These important questions face any human resource manager, whether
a line executive or a staff professional. Though most managers, and
certainly most HR professionals, would readily agree that human resources
are among the most important in terms of dollar expenditures and effects
on organizational goals, the HRM function is often regarded as a "cost
center" or as an "overhead budget item," with little systematic attention
devoted to its contribution to organizational goals (especially its
contribution to the financial performance of the organization). Indeed,
the question of its contribution to corporate profit is still controversial
enough to merit recent debate in a widely-read professional journal (Gow,
1985). It is difficult to imagine such a debate regarding the Finance,
Marketing, Accounting, or Engineering departments.
With increased competition, and evidence from the U.S. and abroad
that competitive companies manage their people differently, organizations
are paying more attention to their HRM decisions. HR managers are finding
it increasingly difficult to justify very large year-to-year human resource
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programs solely because they are "good for human relations," "being done
by everyone else in the industry," or "done that way in Japan and Korea."
Instead, the HRM function is being required to justify its existence and
account for its contributions. And appropriately so, because the HRM
function is a steward for the single largest resource in most organizations.
Yet, how can a Personnel manager respond to top management's order to
justify a million-dollar training program? What can a Personnel manager
say when top management proposes cutting 30% of the HRM programs in an
effort to reduce "excess overhead?" How can an HR manager justify
increasing budgets for training and outplacement when the organization
is reducing staff levels to cut costs?
Human resource management programs produce potentially lucrative
returns even when budgets are tight, but because the costs of such programs
are often quite visible, while their benefits remain unmeasured, decision
makers may be tempted to "cut the overhead" without considering lost program
benefits. In contrast, decisions about programs in other management areas
(e.g., marketing, finance, accounting, and plant operations) often consider
not only costs, but dollar estimates of program benefits as well. It is
difficult to imagine an engineer proposing to spend a million dollars to
develop a new production process, without explaining its effects on product
quality or cost. Yet, million-dollar HRM programs are routinely made with
little explicit consideration of their effects on product quality or cost.
For example, the decision to train 1,000 employees can easily incur costs
of $1,000 per trainee (considering course development, instructor time,
travel and lodging), but training results often go unmeasured. Lacking
a systematic analysis of the training program's returns, a top manager
might form the impression that such a million-dollar HRM program is more
utility Analysis: A New Perspective Page 3
expendable tban programs in otber management areas.
Tbis Cbapter explores cost-benefit (or utility) analysis, a decision-
support framework that explicitly considers the costs and benefits of human
resource decisions. utility analysis provides formulas for computing the
dollar value of human resource programs, but it is more than formulas.
It is a way of thinking about HR decisions that makes facts, assumptions
and beliefs behind decisions more explicit, systematic and rational. It
supports human resource decisions even when information is unavailable
or uncertain, translates statistics into useful decision information, and
it helps determine when more information is or is not needed.
Though utility analysis models can be complex and detailed, this
Chapter will emphasize their managerial implications. It presents several
case studies, illustrating how utility analysis models have been developed
to encompass progressively more realistic and complete HRM decisions.
Though it will draw on sophisticated algebraic models (with citations to
direct interested readers), algebraic formulas will be minimized to
emphasize the findings and implications. The first section discusses the
advantages of cost-benefit models compared to other decision systems.
The second discusses general issues important to applying cost-benefit
models to human resource decisions. The third section shows how utility
analysis applies to programs affecting the existing stock of employees,
using a training program as an example. The fourth section develops cost-
benefit models for decisions affecting employee flows, using a case study
to illustrate each model's contribution. The final section presents
implications and conclusions.
Why Use Cost-Benefit Analysis for Human Resource Management Decisions?
Decision makers concerned with how to invest resources in HRM programs
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have several types of information available to support those decisions.
Let us examine where cost-benefit (utility) analysis fits in.
Alternative Decision Systems
Costs. Organizations could make their human resource management
decisions based on costs, attempting to minimize them. Costs are incurred
in every human resource management activity, so reducing costs often means
reducing the number or scope of human resource activities. Other typical
cost-reduction techniques involve reducing presumably costly employee
behaviors such as turnover (Cascio, 1987, Flamholtz, 1985). Of course,
this is only half the picture. Reducing HR activities or presumably costly
employee behaviors may cut costs, but it may also reduce organizational
effectiveness. Human resource activities or employee behaviors that at
first appear costly may actually enhance effectiveness, as occurs for
example when turnover creates opportunities to hire highly-qualified
employees, but a cost-focused decision system may fail to detect this.
Informally-defined benefits. Organizations might informally consider
human resource management benefits without an explicit framework or system,
but the sheer complexity of these benefits can lead to unsystematic
shortcuts. For example, a recruitment program might be assessed in terms
of filling vacancies, while a selection test might be assessed in terms
of whether competitors use such devices, or whether it will be vulnerable
to scrutiny by the regional Equal Employment Opportunity office. Lacking
a systematic approach, the analysis may be dominated by unsubstantiated
beliefs, personal influence or political power, and the decisions may not
achieve organizational goals.
Cost or Head Count Ratios. Decision makers might calculate any of
a variety of ratios designed to analyze HR costs or staff levels. For
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example, one might compute the ratio of total employees to HR staff
employees, or the ratio of sales to HR costs, or the ratio of training
costs to the number of trainees (Fitz-Enz, 1984). Such ratios are sometimes
compared over time, or to other competing organizations. While they can
be useful for directing attention to staff levels or costs, they provide
no framework for interpretation or decision making. If your cost ratio
is higher than last year (or higher than a competitor's), what decision
does that suggest? Is it always bad to have high or rising HR staff-to-
employee ratios or HR cost-to-sales ratios? Clearly, if the programs and
activities provided in return for such cost or staff levels are producing
high orgqnizational returns, there is less cause for concern than if they
are not. Thus, cost and head count ratios must be interpreted within a
decision framework to be useful in guiding HR decisions.
The fourth approach involves auditing human resourceAudits.
activities (Mahler, 1979; Sheibar, 1974). Such audits can be quite
systematic and detailed, and can demonstrate whether human resource
programs are being implemented as planned. However, they provide only
limited information because they may not address whether the plan was
appropriate in the first place. It is little consolation to find that
an ill-conceived program was implemented as planned and incurred costs
at the budgeted level, or that it was applied to the projected number of
employees. A decision system needs to address costs and benefits before
the activities are implemented, as well as providing an evaluation framework
after they have been implemented.
Formal studies. The fifth approach involves conducting formal
statistical studies to determine the effects of human resource programs.
Examples include validation studies reporting the statistical relationship
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between test scores and performance ratings, and experiments comparing
the statistical difference in output levels between groups receiving
different training programs. However, statistics alone are often not very
useful to human resource managers, who are less concerned with exploring
theory than with determining how to invest their limited resources to
achieve the greatest benefit. Rarely does a scientific study even mention
dollar values, let alone report results in terms of investments and returns.
Fully-detailed cost-benefit analysis. The sixth approach involves
a full-blown cost-benefit analysis. The organization would identify
alternatives, draw up a list of all the factors to be considered for each
alternative, measure the factors on a cornmon scale (such as dollars), and
then compute the benefits and subtract the costs to determine the overall
net value of each alternative. The best alternatives, or those with net
values (or returns on investment) exceeding a minimum standard, would be
implemented. The problem here, of course, is that all of the decision
factors cannot be evaluated precisely and with certainty. Moreover,
measuring everything may be quite costly. still, the cost-benefit approach
has a good deal of merit, if only it could be efficiently applied.
Advantages of a Cost-Benefit System
A cost-benefit approach offers the following advantages compared to other
approaches:
1. Explicitness. Identifying and evaluating costs and benefits
makes the assumptions, beliefs and facts more visible to all.
They can be discussed, questioned and corrected, thus reducing
the chance that incorrect or counter-productive information will
go undetected.
2. Consistency. Human resource decisions are complex. Without
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a system, it is easy for HR managers and strategic planners to
make some decisions based on one set of issues, and other
decisions based on a different set. For example, recruitment
programs may be chosen based on low cost and probability of
filling vacancies (Rynes & Boudreau, 1986), while selection
programs are chosen based on legal defensibility and tradition.
Yet, these four factors are relevant to both decisions, and none
of these factors reflects the productivity of those hired. A
cost-benefit system encourages consistency by providing a list
of factors to be explicitly considered before basing a decision
on only a few of them.
3. Efficiency. A cost-benefit system promotes efficiency because
it can be applied to many decisions. Once developed, the
organization can spend less time re-inventing the wheel for each
new decision. While each decision is unique and may require
some unique analysis effort, organizing the most commonly-
considered factors in a cost-benefit system frees resources to
focus on the really unique factors. Moreover, a cost-benefit
approach guides the use of information and information systems.
By identifying the decision factors, a cost-benefit framework
allows decision makers to set priorities in gathering and using
information, as we shall see in the subsequent examples.
A cost-benefit system improves communication4. Communication.
among decision makers because it offers a common "language" for
decision making. The identified set of decision factors and
the system for applying them allows HR managers and their staff
to coordinate. It is not necessary to redefine the data gathering
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task every time, so decision makers can devote more resources
to making decisions rather than identifying and locating
information. Moreover, because organizations are measured (at
least in part) by how well they use dollar-valued resources to
achieve goals, communication with other management functions
is improved by cost-benefit information that is expressed in
dollars. When HR decision makers express their contribution
in the same bottom-line terms used by other management functions
(such as Finance, Marketing, Accounting and Operations), cross-
function communication (and perhaps credibility) may be improved.
Cost-Benefit Decision Systems in Human Resource Management
The principal drawback of a cost-benefit decision system is that all
the costs and benefits cannot be measured precisely (indeed, some cannot
be measured at all). It is impossible to quantify the variety of factors
affecting decisions about human resource activities into a single dollar
value that expresses their contribution to the organization. But, is this
really what a decision system must do? It is certainly not the typical
approach used in other management functions. Anyone who has tried to
forecast the stock market or predict the sales of a new product realizes
that Finance and Marketing are not exact sciences. Yet, these functions
typically express their programs' effects in dollar terms. Their objective
is to enhance decisions by focusing on the important factors, isolating
the ambiguous or uncertain factors, and systematically and explicitly
addressing potential risk and uncertainty.
Unfortunately, the simplifications typically adopted to address human
resource decisions (such as focusing only on costs, adopting programs
because of tradition, and ignoring human resource benefits because they
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are uncertain) can have undesirable effects. A cost-benefit decision system
offers a way out of this bind. It too simplifies the decision situation,
proposing a set of variables to describe human resource program
consequences, but it also efficiently summarizes a great deal of important
information about human resource programs in an explicit, consistent and
systematic way. It does not require measuring everything. To the contrary,
cost-benefit techniques can help to pinpoint important information, and
thus reduce the effort necessary to gather information.
Applying utility Analysis to Human Resource Decisions
utility analysis is the term for a set of cost-benefit models
originally developed by industrial psychologists concerned with selection,
and recently extended to other human resource programs and decisions.
"utility" simply means usefulness, and the aim of the models is to predict,
explain and improve the usefulness of different human resource management
decisions.
Requirements for utility Analysis
Utility analysis, like other decision systems, requires: (1) A problem,
or the gap between what is desired and what is currently achieved; (2)
a set of alternatives to address the problem; (3) a set of attributes,
or the variables that describe the important characteristics of the
alternatives (such as effects on productivity, costs, employee attitudes,
etc.); (4) a utility function, the system used to combine the attributes
into an overall judgment of each alternative's usefulness. utility analysis
is generally employed when the first two requirements are met. Given a
set of alternatives, utility models suggest a set of attributes and a
utility function for combining attributes into an overall usefulness value,
usually expressed in dollars.
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The Unit of Analysis: Human Resource Programs
Utility analysis models focus on decisions about human resource
programs. A human resource program (sometimes called an "intervention"
by industrial psychologists, or an "activity" by HR professionals) is simply
a set of activities or procedures that affect human resource value.
Examples include selection tests, training courses, recruiting techniques,
compensation plans, and job redesign. Decisions about such programs provide
a vital link between broader human resource strategies and the day-to-day
operational decisions made by human resource managers.
Human resource programs are more specific than human resource
strategies. strategies address broader issues such as staffing levels,
functional areas to emphasize, and appropriate organizational structures.
But, strategy implementation requires decisions about human resource
programs. For example, a strategy intended to increase manufacturing
employee flexibility requires choices among competing programs in selection,
training and job design.
At the same time, decisions about human resource programs encompass
more than purely operational decisions about individual employees (such
as which employee to hire, train, promote or reward). Each of these
decisions occurs within the framework of human resource programs. For
example, deciding which employee(s) to hire or promote requires a framework
of programs generating a pool of job candidates (such as college recruitment
or job posting) and programs that provide staffing information (such as
selection tests or skill inventories).
What Makes a Human Resource Program Useful? Quantity, Quality and Cost
Decisions about human resource programs have wide-ranging effects,
subject to the scrutiny of many constituents. No decision system
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encompasses all of these effects, but utility analysis focuses on three
important factors: quantity, quality and cost. HR programs have value
when they affect many employee work behaviors over time, when they produce
large improvements (or avoid large reductions) in the quality (or value)
of those work behaviors, and when they minimize the costs required to
develop, implement and maintain the programs.
These three factors are similar to those typically used in other
management functions, and this similarity is not accidental. Marketing,
Finance and Manufacturing Operations' programs also produce value to the
extent that they produce large quantities of productivity (such as sales
or units produced), large improvements in productive quality (such as
reduced costs or increased quality), and minimize the necessary cost or
investment. The utility analysis models presented in this chapter reflect
the similarities between investing resources in human resource management
programs and investing resources in programs from other management areas.
In considering quantity, quality and cost, it is important to recognize
that different constituents may be concerned with different aspects of
these three factors. For example, operating managers may be concerned
with the program's effects on unit revenues and operating costs in the
short run (perhaps because they expect to be promoted shortly), while the
financial and accounting staff may be concerned with the programs' impact
on the unit's financial statements, and top management may be more concerned
with enhancing the long-term flexibility and productivity of the work force.
Utility analysis can reflect these different perspectives, but each one
implies a different way of measuring program payoff.
Utility analysis must also identify the mechanisms through which HR
programs affect the organization. For example, organizations facing
Utility Analysis: A N@w Perspective Page 12
increasing product demand use enhanced employee productivity to increase
output, while organizations facing cost pressures apply productivity
improvements to reduce head count and compensation costs. Again, utility
analysis can encompass each of these effects, but the analyst must carefully
define and measure the payoff to reflect the appropriate effect. A common
mistake in utility analyses is to measure whatever outcomes are convenient
(e.g., sales or absenteeism) even when such outcomes have little relevance
to organizational goals.
utility analysis models clearly omit some decision factors. They
emphasize productivity-related outcomes, and ignore other potentially
important factors such as employee attitudes, union relationships,
government or public relations, and political considerations. They
represent one valuable decision support tool in the arsenal of HR decision
makers. They do not provide the answers to all human resource decisions
any more than a financial analysis alone fully addresses the decision about
whether or not to build a nuclear power plant. utility analysis models
are useful because they summarize a great deal of productivity-related
information so that it can be compared to these other imPortant factors.
What if We Can't Measure It? Precision in utility Analysis
Though utility analysis models are all based on three simple concepts
of quantity, quality and cost, they are nonetheless complex. This
complexity can give the incorrect imPression that utility analysis is
impractical. Some of the variables cannot be measured precisely (or cannot
be measured at all). Those that can be measured are often uncertain and
prone to change over time or in different situations. Finally, some
variables that could be measured precisely are simply very expensive to
measure.
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These considerations are legitimate and important, but measurement
limitations and uncertainty should not prevent systematic analysis of human
resource programs any more than uncertainty about stock prices or the
inability to precisely measure consumer preferences prevents systematic
analysis of financial investments or marketing strategies. The limitations
and costs of information are quite well recognized in management, and there
are ways to address these problems (cf. Bierman, Bonnini & Hausman, 1981,
Chapters 4-10). Simply put, information is useful when it: (1) is likely
to correct decisions that would have been incorrect without it; (2) when
the corrections are important and produce large benefits; and (3) when
the cost of the information does not outweigh the expected benefit of the
corrected decisions.
In other words, information gathering is itself an investment decision.
Uncertainty about human resource program effects should lead decision makers
not to abandon systematic analysis, but to use methods that identify the
sources of uncertainty, how (or whether) it affects decisions, and when
to invest in better information. This approach differs from common
practices that focus only on the most measurable information, such as costs,
or base decisions on inexplicit beliefs or opinions. Subsequent sections
will illustrate how utility analysis models make human resource decisions
more systematic even in the face of uncertainty.
Two Categories of Human Resource Management Programs and Effects
The concepts noted above (costs and benefits; human resource programs;
quantity, quality and cost) can be applied to all human resource program
decisions, but the analysis differs depending on whether the program affects
employee stocks or flows.
Employee stocks. Programs affecting employee stocks (such as training,
productivity more when they: (1) Affect large stocks of employees and time
periods; (2) Cause large average increases in the value of employee job
behaviors; and (3) Achieve 1 and 2 at minimum cost. Thus, decisions
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compensation, performance feedback and employee involvement) aim to increase
valuable characteristics (such as skills, abilities or motivation) among
existing employee to improve their current job performance. In terms of
quantity, quality and cost, decisions affecting employee stocks enhance
affecting employee stocks "work" by improving employee behaviors in their
existing assignments.
Employee flows. Employee flows occur when employees move into, through
and out of an organization through selection, separation, promotion,
demotion and transfer. In terms of quantity, quality and cost, decisions
affecting employee flows enhance productivity more when they: (1) Affect
large numbers of employee flows and time periods, (2) Achieve large
increases in the value of job behaviors by making better person-job matches,
and (3) Achieve 1 and 2 at minimum cost. Most research has focused on
utility analysis for selection decisions, but the approach applies as well
to other programs affecting employee flows (such as improved recruitment,
job posting, or incentives that encourage employees to apply for jobs or
promotions) . Programs affecting employee flows "work" by improving the
pattern of movements into, through and out of the organization so that
more valuable employees are placed in jobs or work roles.
Utility Analysis for Decisions Affecting Employee stocks
utility models have been applied to performance feedback (Florin-Thuma
and Boudreau, in press; Landy, Farr & Jacobs, 1982) and training (Mathieu
& Leonard, 1987; Schmidt, Hunter & Pearlman, 1982). As noted, such models
could also be applied to other programs affecting employee stocks (such
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as compensation and employee involvement). To illustrate utility analysis
for such programs, let us examine the case of a large manufacturing
organization faced with a choice between two training programs. Though
disguised, this example is based on an actual utility analysis application
conducted in 1986.
The Decision Situation
The decision involved a choice between delivering training for
engineers through a traditional classroom system, or through a sophisticated
audio-video network. While some training staff believed the audio-video
system was a good investment, cost pressures had convinced others that
it was simply too expensive. Table 1 describes the example in terms of
quantity, quality and cost.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 Here
----------------------------------------
Cost. The classroom program would cost $451,035 over five years,
while building and staffing the audio-video network would cost $1,031,147
over five years (with the largest portion occurring in up-front costs).
To be conservative and ensure no unfair advantage to the Audio-Video system,
the entire cost of the system was borne by this one program, though if
implemented many programs would share it.
Quantity. The target population for training was the 200 currently-
employed engineers, plus 20 new engineers added every year for the next
four years. Due to training capacity constraints, Classroom training could
train only 40 employees per year, or 200 over the 5-year target period.
Audio-Video training could accommodate up to 200 persons per year, thus
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it could fully train the incumbent work force in the first year, and then
easily accommodate the additional 20 new hires in each future year, for
a total of 280 trainees over five years.
Cost per trainee. Following its typical practice, the organization
computed the accounting cost per trainee by dividing total costs by the
number trained. Classroom training cost $2,255 per trainee (i.e.,
$451,035/200) and Audio-Video training cost $3,683 per trainee (i.e.,
$1,031,147/280). These figures suggested that Audio-Video training must
demonstrate much higher per-trainee effectiveness than Classroom training
to be cost effective. Discussions concerning whether this was likely had
reached no definite conclusions. Some believed that spending over one
million dollars on a training delivery system for 280 engineers could not
possibly be cost-effective. Moreover, some believed that cost-benefit
analysis required a costly and complex experimental study to discover the
program's effects on performance.
Leverage Computation. Evaluating training programs solely based on
cost-per-trainee is like evaluating a manufacturing plant based on the
amount of raw materials it consumes, rather than on its production of
finished goods. How much productivity would be affected by the two training
programs? The number of trained engineers the programs would place into
the work force over the five-year period is shown in the middle portion
of Table 1 (because engineer tenure averaged more than 5 years, we assumed
no turnover.) Because Audio-Video delivery trains more people earlier
(e.g., the first 200 trainees are productive for the entire 5-year period),
it affects 1,200 total person-years of productivity (i.e., 200 plus 220,
etc.). Classroom training trains a total of 200 employees, but only 40
at a time, so the work force doesn't reach 200 trainees until Year 5.
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still, even Classroom training affects 600 person-years of productivity
(i.e., 40 plus 80, etc.). This is the leverage of the two programs, and
this leverage computation demonstrates how faster training can substantially
increase the program's effect. Leverage occurs because human resource
programs affect many employees who affect productivity for a long time.
Quality. Typical of many organizations, little information was
available to help us estimate the effects of the two training programs
on employee quality, and certainly none that could forecast the dollar
value of improved performance. To explicitly sYmbolize this uncertainty,
the unknown average productivity increase per-trainee, per-year was simply
sYmbolized P1 for Option 1 (Classroom Training) and P2 for Option 2 (Audio-
Video Training).
Payoff formulas. Even without knowing the effects of either program
on employee quality, the cost and leverage information proved quite useful
in constructing the payoff formulas shown in Table 1. The utility
(usefulness) of Classroom training (i.e., u1) goes up by $600 with every
one-dollar increase in average employee quality per person-year, offsetting
the $451,035 cost. Similarly, the utility of Audio-Video training (i.e.,
u2) goes up by $1,200 for everyone-dollar increase in average employee
quality per person-year, offsetting its $1,031,147 cost. These payoff
functions suggested that quite modest program effects might be sufficient
to make training worthwhile and that large training effects on employee
value would produce quite sizable returns to the training investment.
For example, an average productivity increase of $1,500 per person-year
would produce total utility of $148,965 from Classroom training and $168,853
from Audio-Video training. This represents a 33% return on investment
for the Classroom training, and a 16% return on investment from the Audio-
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Video training. At higher average productivity increases, the relative
advantage of the Audio-Video training is enhanced.
Break-Even analysis. Of course, the $1,500 figure used above was
only a guess. As noted, little information was available to precisely
estimate the dollar increase in employee value per person-year from either
training program. However, rather than embark on potentially costly studies
attempting to measure this variable, we divided the costs by the leverage
to obtain the values for P1 and P2 that would cause each program's total
payoff to equal (or "break-even" with) its costs. These values are shown
in Table 1. The Classroom training costs would be covered if it produced
at least $752 per person-year (i.e., $451,035/600), while the break-even
value for the Audio-Video training program was $860 per person-year (i.e.,
$1,031,147/1,200). Notice that these values are much lower than the costs-
per-trainee computed earlier. Relatively modest training effects could
justify what had originally appeared to be a very large necessary training
investment.
Program comparisons. While the break-even analysis was enlightening,
it treated each training option independently, and therefore did not address
the question of whether to substitute the more expensive Audio-Video
training for the less expensive Classroom training. However, the same
break-even logic could be applied to this question. What are the values
of the unknown Classroom training effect (i.e., P1) and Audio-Video training
effect (i.e., P2) that would make the total utility of Audio-Video training
equal to Classroom training? The formula for these relative effects is
found by subtracting the Classroom payoff formula from the Audio-Video
payoff formula, producing a payoff formula reflecting the difference between
the two programs as shown in Table 1. By setting the difference (U2 -
utility Analysis: A New Per6p~ctive Page 19
U1) to zero, we obtained a formula for the value of P2 that would be
necessary to make the Audio-Video program payoff exactly equal to the
Classroom program payoff, given a certain value for P1 [i.e., P2 = (.5
x P1) + $484]. The decision rules implied by this break-even analysis
are shown at the bottom of Table 1. For example, if the payoff per person-
year from Option 1 (P1) is equal to $2,000, then the payoff per person-
year from Option 2 (P2) must exceed only $1,484 [i.e., (.5 X 2,000) + 484]
to justify the more expensive Audio-Video training. If Classroom training
produces large productivity increases (i.e., greater than $968 per person-
year), it can be cost-effective to invest in the faster Audio-Video training
system even if it has a smaller average productivity effect per person-
year than Classroom training. The break-even formula provides a simple
equation that shows when each program is the better investment. Moreover,
the computations can be further simplified using personal computers
(Boudreau & Milkovich, 1988, Chapter 8).
Decision Results. Even without measuring training effectiveness,
the break-even analysis focused the decision process and helped to better
define the critical issues. Instead of arguing about whether one or another
estimate of training effects was right or wrong, the decision focused on
whether the Audio-Video training effect was enough to justify switching
to it. In light of the important work done by these engineers, and the
undisputed value of this training for engineering performance, the Audio-
Video expenditure could be justified. Moreover, because other training
programs could also use the Audio-Video network, the fact that it could
be justified for this program alone made it a worthwhile investment. The
break-even analysis demonstrated that a costly and complex effectiveness
study (earlier thought to be essential for applying cost-benefit analysis)
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was not necessary to improve decisions.
This example demonstrated how the utility analysis concepts of
quantity, quality and cost can be applied to training programs. Similar
applications are possible for other programs affecting employee stocks,
such as compensation and employee involvement. Moreover, it demonstrated
how an explicit cost-benefit analysis can address uncertainty about program
effects. Uncertainty is a fact of decision making. Break-even analysis
is one method of addressing uncertainty explicitly, and reducing its
detrimental effects on decision quality. Rich and Boudreau (1987)
demonstrated several other methods of addressing uncertainty when cost-
benefit analyses are applied to HRM decisions. We now discuss how to apply
these cost-benefit principles to decisions affecting employee flows.
utility Analysis for Decisions Affecting Employee Flows
Analyzing the costs and benefits of programs that affect employee
stocks is useful, but what about employee flows? How can we determine
whether resources devoted to improve selection tests, college recruiting,
turnover/layoff management, and internal staffing offer sufficient returns
to justify their expense?
As noted earlier, employee flows occur when people into, through and
out of organizational positions/jobs (e.g., selection, turnover, promotions,
demotions and transfers). HRM decisions affect such flows as well as
affecting the existing stock of employees. However, decisions that affect
employee flows operate differently. Whereas decisions affecting employee
stocks work by enhancing the value of employees in their current positions,
decisions affecting employee flows work by affecting which individuals
will occupy those positions.
We can consider three general processes through which individuals
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flow through the work force (Boudreau & Berger, 1985b; Milkovich & Boudreau,
1988, Ch. 10-13): (1) External recruitment/selection, which involves
attracting a pool of job applicants and choosing which of them will be
hired into the organization; (2) External separation/retention, which
involves managing the quantity and pattern of employee separations that
affect which employees are retained by the organization; and (3) Internal
staffing, which involves managing the quantity and pattern of employee
movements between positions within the organization. Though these processes
are typically managed, evaluated and planned as if they were independent,
they are obviously quite closely related. Effectively managing each of
them depends on the quantity, quality and cost effects of HRM programs
that identify candidates for employment opportunities, that choose which
candidates will fill employment vacancies, and that affect who stays and
leaves the job.
---------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 Here
----------------------------------------
The following section develops utility models for decisions affecting
employee flows. The models proceed from simpler to more complex. The
first models focus solely on external selection, with subsequent models
adding enhancements to reflect and integrate the other employee flow
processes. Table 2 provides a summary of the decision models, the features
added by each one, and the decision addressed by each model. Model #1
focuses on choosing whom to hire from among one group of external job
applicants. Model #2 incorporates factors useful in making HRM decisions
compatible with the financial considerations typically applied to other
investments. Model #3 extends the model to reflect the effects of re-
utility Analysis: A New perspective Page 22
applying selection programs over time. Model #4 incorporates the effects
of recruitment into the external staffing utility analysis. Model #5
incorporates the effects of employee separations (e.g., turnover, layoffs,
resignations) into the recruitment-selection utility analysis. Finally,
Model #6 incorporates the effects of internal employee movements (e.g.,
promotions, demotions and transfers) into the analysis, providing an
integrated analysis framework for the staffing process. Thus, Table 2
provides an outline and summary for the discussion that follows.
The Case study Decision Situation
We will explore utility models for employee flows using a case study.
Though hypothetical, this case study uses information based on published
studies and realistic assumptions. However, readers may find it useful
to substitute values from their own experience to produce illustrations
that are more familiar to them. The important point is not the numbers
themselves, but the decision systems they illustrate. Throughout the
analysis, break-even analysis will be used to illustrate how uncertainty
can be explicitly and systematically addressed. Readers should also keep
in mind that though the computations behind the models can become complex,
computer analysis methods (e.g., Boudreau, 1985, 1987a) greatly reduce
the computational burden.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 Here
----------------------------------------
Consider a large organization employing 4,404 entry-level computer
programmers, and 1,000 data system managers one level above them. Table
3 contains a description of the characteristics of the two jobs (adapted
from Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie and Muldrow, 1979 and Boudreau, 1987b).
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Currently, 618 programmers leave the entry-level job each year and are
replaced by 618 new hires. The organization experiences 100 separations
per year in the upper-level data system manager job, and has a promotion-
from-within policy. Thus, 100 employees are promoted from the entry-level
computer programmer job to fill the vacancies. An additional 100 new hires
fill the entry-level vacancies in the programmer job created by these
promotions, bringing the total number of new hires per year to 718.
Human resource managers in this situation are called upon to make
decisions about how employees are selected, how they are recruited, how
their turnover should be managed, and how they move between the two jobs.
How can managers determine whether the outcomes of these activities provide
sufficient returns to justify organizational investments? How much
additional investment could be justified? How should resources be allocated
between activities such as recruitment, external selection and internal
staffing? To illustrate how utility analysis addresses issues like these,
we will consider four questions:
1. Should the current employment interview be augmented by an ability
test?
2. Should the recruitment program be changed to attract higher-
quality applicants?
3. Should the pattern of employee separations be changed to retain
more of the good performers, and how much would such a change
be worth?
4. Should an assessment center be used to promote programmers to
system managers, and how much would such a program be worth?
Utility Analysis for Employee Selection
The first strategic question addresses the method used to select new
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employees into the Programmer job: "Should the current employment interview
be augmented by an ability test?" Selection test development and validation
can be an expensive and time consuming process, and human resource managers
may be called to justify such costs. Several models have been proposed
to address this question.
Preliminary Attempts to Develop Selection Utility Models
utility analysis models for selection enjoy a long history, but it
was only recently that they reflected dollar values. However, understanding
the early utility models shows why researchers and managers were compelled
to develop utility analysis models for selection. More detailed summaries
of these early models can be found elsewhere (e.g., Boudreau, in press;
Cascio, 1987, Hunter & Schmidt, 1982; Milkovich & Boudreau, 1988).
The earliest index of selection value was the correlation (or validity)
coefficient, which is a statistical measure of the linear relationship
between scores on a selection device (called a predictor) and subsequent
performance levels. The validity coefficient ranges from -1.0 to +1.0,
with zero indicating no linear relationship and higher values indicating
stronger positive linear relationships. The correlation coefficient
reflects one aspect of a test's value, but it says nothing about the
quantity of employees and time periods affected, fails to reflect any
tangible quality index (such as dollars), and ignores testing costs.
A second index of selection usefulness originally proposed by Taylor
and Russell (1939) was the "success ratio," or the probability that someone
achieving a passing score on a predictor would turn out to be at least
minimally successful on the job. Under certain assumptions, the success
ratio is improved by higher validity coefficients, by setting higher passing
scores on the predictor (e.g., being more selective), and when only about
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half of the applicant pool would be successful if hired without the
predictor. Though the success ratio incorporates more factors than simply
validity, it has limited value as a cost-benefit index because it ignores
the quantity of employees and time periods affected, and it ignores testing
costs. Moreover, the success ratio distinguishes only between those who
achieve minimally acceptable performance on the job, and those who do not.
Model #1, The One-Cohort External Selection utility Model
These early models laid the foundation and highlighted the need for
selection utility models that present the value of selection investments
in more tangible units (preferably dollars) and reflect the fact that job
performance doesn't simply fall into two categories, but varies widely.
Let us return now to our case study to examine more recent utility analysis
models that address these issues.
How the utility model works. The first utility analysis model focuses
only on one group (or "cohort") of employees hired with the new test, using
the Brogden-Cronbach-Gleser (B-C-G) utility model (Brogden, 1946a, 1946b,
1949; Brogden & Taylor, 1950; Cronbach & Gleser, 1965). In this model,
the quantity of person-years of productivity affected by a selection system
is equal to the size of the hired group multiplied by their average tenure.
The quality produced by the new selection system is the difference in
average dollar-valued productivity per-person, per-year between those
selected with the new system and those who would be selected without it.
The cost of the selection program is equal to the additional costs incurred
to develop (or acquire) the new selection device, and to apply it to one
group of job applicants.
Quality is the product of three factors: (1) the validity coefficient
(or the difference between the validity coefficient of the proposed
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selection system versus that obtained without it) reflecting prediction
accuracy; (2) the average standardized test score of those selected
(reflecting how selective the organization is), which can be estimated
using standard tables (Naylor & Shine, 1965); and (3) the "dollar value
of a one-standard-deviation improvement" in new-hire value. This term
can be called the SD of Applicant Value (usually symbolized as SDy), because
it reflects the dollar value to the organization of obtaining applicants
whose average performance is one standard deviation higher than other
applicants.
SDy measurement controversy. The SD of Applicant Value (SDy) has
become a controversial topic in industrial psychology, and requires some
explanation. This variable is necessary because the utility model based
on the validity coefficient expresses both the selection test score and
the value of job behaviors predicted by the test in standard deviation
units. In the quality computation described above, the product of the
validity coefficient and the average standardized test score equals the
difference in productive value in standard deviation units between
applicants selected with the device and those selected without it. To
translate the standard deviation differences into dollars per person-year,
they are multiplied by SDy which represents the dollar value of a one-
standard-deviation performance difference per person-year between
applicants. In general, we would expect SDy to be larger when job
performance is greatly affected by individual differences (e.g., when
managers have great discretion over how they carry out their jobs and make
decisions), when the consequences of those decisions are important (e.g.,
when employees handle expensive raw materials), and when the distribution
of job-relevant characteristics is very large in the applicant pool (such
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as when the pool of applicants for a managerial job contains recent college
graduates as well as experienced former managers).
Most utility analysis research by psychologists compares different
SDy measures. Some (e.g., Schmidt, et al., 1979) have measured it by
surveying supervisors of the job, asking them to estimate the value of
a person who is better than 95% of the population, a person who is better
than only 50% of the population (an average performer), and a person who
is better than only 15% of the population. Under certain assumptions,
the difference between the estimate of the 95th and 50th percentiles, and
the difference between the estimate of the 50th and 15th percentiles should
be the same, and should represent the value of a one-standard-deviation
difference. others (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1983) have estimated it as
20% of average productivity, or 40% of average salary among job incumbents.
Still others have adopted detailed and complex methods based on behavioral
anchors (e.g., Cascio & Ramos, 1986). Boudreau (in press) reviewed this
measurement research, and found that different measurement techniques did
indeed produce different SDy values, but none offered a convincing case
for greater accuracy or validity. Considering the difficulties in measuring
job performance differences between existing employees on any scale, it
seems unlikely that we will soon discover a generally-accepted measure
of dollar-valued performance differences among job applicants. As we shall
see, however, this limitation does not threaten most utility analysis
applications.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 Here
----------------------------------------
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Application to the case. Let us assume that the organization is
considering using a paper and pencil test of programming ability, the
Programmer Aptitude Test (PAT) to select programmers. Table 4 shows the
information needed to apply the one-cohort selection utility model. The
model focuses on one cohort and one job, so we focus on the consequences
for selecting 618 computer programmers. Costs equal $12,360, calculated
by multiplying the cost of testing each applicant (i.e., $10) by the number
of applicants tested (1,236). The quantity of employees and time periods
is calculated by multiplying the average tenure (9.69 years) by the number
selected (618) to produce 5,988 person-years. The quality per person-year
is the product of the increase in average standardized test score compared
to random selection (i.e., .80 with a 50% selection ratio, from the Naylor-
Shine tables) times the validity coefficient (.76, estimated from previous
studies) times the dollar value of a one-standard-deviation difference
between job applicants (calculated by Schmidt, et al. to be $10,413 per
year), which equals $6,331 per person-year. To simplify this analysis,
we assume that .76 represents the increase in validity obtained by using
the PAT versus not using it (i.e., not using the PAT results in essentially
random selection). Of course, the models can easily be modified to reflect
comparisons between two selection systems with different validity.
Utility computation. Multiplying quality (i.e., $6,331 per person-
year) by quantity (i.e., 5,988 person-years) produces an estimated benefit
of $37,910,028 for the 9.69 years. Subtracting testing costs of $12,360
produces increased utility of $37.9 million more than random selection,
as shown in Table 4. The $37.9 million divided by the $12,360 increased
testing costs represents a return of 306,634 percent! Not surprisingly,
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these results caught the attention of psychologists and some managers
because they were much higher than most people would have suspected.
Dealing with uncertainty. These values certainly do not represent
a perfect prediction of the dollar value of selection. Many of the
parameters represent estimates, and thus contain various sources of bias,
uncertainty and error. However, as the break-even analysis of Table 1
showed, uncertainty should not prevent applying decision models. We can
apply break-even analysis to this example as well. Considering the
controversy surrounding measures of SDy, we might expect uncertainty and
skepticism about its value. We can re-write the payoff function leaving
this parameter unknown:
utility (3,641 X SDy) $12,360 (1)
Dividing $12,360 by 3,641 gives the value for SDy that would make benefits
exactly equal costs (and total utility exactly equal to zero). This value
is $3.39 per person-year, and is the lowest value for SDy that would still
justify the testing costs. Hiring superior applicants may be valued because
it increases the amount of work, the quality of work, or allows the same
work to be accomplished with fewer programmers. While many might argue
that Schmidt, et al.'s value of $10,413 may be too high, it is difficult
to imagine that a one-standard-deviation difference in value (e.g., the
difference between a superior programmer applicant and an average applicant)
would be less than $3.39 per year. Thus, break-even analysis shows that
the wisdom of investing in improved selection is not uncertain, only the
magnitude of the positive returns to that investment.
Break-even analysis can address even greater uncertainty. Suppose
we doubted that using the PAT would increase selection validity by .76,
and that our selected applicants would attain an average standardized test
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score of .80 (which assumes that the top 50% of applicants will receive
and accept job offers). Neither of these parameters is without scientific
controversy (Sackett, Schmitt, Tenopyr & Kehoe & Zedeck, 1985; Schmidt,
Hunter, Pearlman & Hirsh, 1985; Boudreau & Rynes, 1985). We can symbolize
the unknown effect on quality as QUAL, and re-write the utility formula
in terms of quantity (i.e., 5,988 person-years) and cost (i.e., $12,360):
Utility (5,988 X QUAL) $12,360 (2)
The value for QUAL at which the testing benefits break even with the testing
costs is $2.07 per person-year (i.e., $12,360/5,988). The question boils
down to whether using the PAT instead of selecting randomly will improve
selection decisions enough to raise the value of those selected by an
average of at least $2.07 per year (over 9.69 years).
Finally, consider the possibility that testing costs are uncertain.
Suppose we felt they might be as high as $1,000 per applicant rather than
$10, implying a total testing cost of $1,236,000. We could re-write
Equation 2 to reflect this as follows:
utili ty = (5,988 X QUAL) $1,236,000 (3)
The break-even value for QUAL is increased by 100 times to $207 per person-
year (i.e., $1,236,000/5,988). Thus, even if costs are 100 times higher
than expected, they will be offset by rather modest selection effects per
person-year. This occurs because of the large leverage (i.e., 5,988 person-
years) affected by this selection program.
Model #2: Financial One-Cohort External Selection Utility Model
The previous analysis provides a systematic framework that focuses
attention on selection costs and benefits. One consequence of such a focus,
however, is that it draws attention to the financial implications of human
resource investments. Line managers and those in other functional areas
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(such as Finance, Accounting and Marketing) frequently incorporate financial
factors not usually considered by human resource managers. What are the
tax implications of increased productive value? Wouldn't hiring superior
programmers require higher costs to attract and retain them? Is it
appropriate to value productivity increases obtained next year equal to
productivity increases obtained up to 10 years from now? Human resource
managers unprepared to address such questions may find that their cost-
benefit numbers lack credibility or even lead to incorrect conclusions
(Boudreau, 1983a; Cronshaw & Alexander, 1986). The next utility model
addresses these financial considerations.
How the utility model works. Financial analysis typically adjusts
future projections of revenue and costs to reflect: (1) productivity
increases that enhance the value of goods sold (i.e., "service value")
often require increased "service costs" to maintain those productivity
increases, in addition to the direct costs of the productivity improvement
program (e.g., increased sales may require increased inventories and
increased sales commissions); (2) benefits received and costs incurred
in the future are worth less than today's benefits and costs, because
benefits received (or costs incurred) today can be invested earlier to
earn more interest than those received later (this interest rate is called
the "discount rate"); and (3) increases in organizational profits that
are subject to income taxes carry an obligation to pay some of the increased
profit to Federal, state or Local governments. The Financial One-Cohort
External Selection utility Model (Model #2 in Table 2) adjusts the estimate
of program quality and cost to reflect these three factors.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 5 Here
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Application to the case situation. Table 5 applies these
considerations to the utility values derived earlier. Necessary additional
information includes the proportion of variable service costs (assumed
to be 5% of the increase in productivity), the corporate tax rate (assumed
to be 45%) and the corporate interest rate reflecting the yearly return
that can be earned on investments (assumed to be 10%).
utility computation. Applying these parameters (see Boudreau, 1983a
for details) produces an adjusted utility value of $12.55 million as shown
in Table 5. This is the after-cost, after-tax, discounted value of
selecting one cohort with the PAT instead of randomly. For an after-tax
testing cost investment of $6,798 (i.e., $12,360 times .55), the
organization receives an after-tax return of $12.55 million in present-
dollar terms. While smaller than the results of Model #1, this return
remains substantial and may be more credible to those accustomed to
financial analysis.
Dealing with uncertainty. We can rewrite Equation 2 to reflect the
financial/economic factors shown in Table 5 as follows:
Utility (1,983 x QUAL) $6,798 (4)
Where 1,983 reflects not only the quantity of person-years affected by
testing, but also the variable cost proportion, the discount rate and the
tax rate. This formula suggests that to justify the $6,798 after-tax
testing cost, those programmers selected with the PAT must be $3.43 more
valuable (i.e., $6,798/1,983) per person-year more than programmers selected
randomly. This value is higher than the $2.07 value obtained in Equation
2, because we now recognize that the benefits of improved testing must
offset not only testing costs, but also increased taxes, service costs
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and interest.
Model #2 can be used to explore uncertainty in the financial/economic
factors themselves, though these variables are typically estimated by the
organization's financial experts, and are relatively certain (c.f., Rich
& Boudreau, 1987). The point is that break-even analysis allows uncertainty
to be explicitly addressed within a financial framework just as it did
when using the non-financial model. Note that these same financial factors
can also be applied to utility analyses for decisions affecting employee
stocks discussed earlier (see Boudreau, 1983a).
Model #3: Financial Multiple-Cohort External Selection Utility Model
utility Models #1 and #2 reflect only the consequences of selecting
one group of new hires (in this example, 618 programmers who stay on the
job for about 10 years). Though the utility values are large, evaluating
only the effects of the first group hired is like evaluating a new
production plant based only on its first production run. Selection programs
are typically re-applied to new groups of applicants for several years.
Managers might well ask, "What's going to happen as we continue to spend
money on this new testing scheme many years in the future?" Obviously,
testing costs will increase as programs are re-applied. What may not be
so obvious is that the leverage and potential benefits of selection programs
also rise substantially as selection programs are re-applied. Model #3
in Table 2 designed to address these concerns (Boudreau, 1983b).
How the utility model works. In the multiple-cohort selection model,
the selection program is re-applied for some chosen number of years. Thus,
the costs of testing applicants are incurred in each future year, rather
than only once in the one-cohort model. Each newly-hired cohort is assumed
to stay for the some number of time periods and then leave. Thus, as the
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selection program is re-applied, the work force contains larger and larger
numbers of better-selected employees. For example, assuming no one leaves
during the first three years of a selection program, the first better-
selected group is joined by a second better-selected group in Year 2, and
still a third better-selected group in Year 3. The multiple-cohort
selection utility model considers both the increased costs of applying
the selection program for several years and the benefits derived from having
more employees on the job. Moreover, it continues to reflect the financial
considerations discussed earlier.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 6 Here
----------------------------------------
Application to the case situation. Table 6 shows the results of
applying Model #3 to the present case. The work force size, number of
applicants, testing costs, number selected, number leaving, tenure, test
validity and financial variables are assumed constant throughout the
analysis. Thus, the PAT still costs $10 per applicant tested, and those
selected with it are assumed to average $6,331 (i.e., $10,413 times .76
times .80) more valuable per person-year than if they were selected
randomly. We assume the PAT is applied for seven years, that each hired
cohort stays ten years, and that we evaluate the testing program for ten
years.
In each of the first seven years, 618 better-selected new hires are
added to the work force, replacing 618 employees selected without the PAT.
Because each cohort stays for ten years, the number of better-selected
programmers in the work force steadily increases. There are 618 better-
selected programmers after one year. These are joined by another 618 in
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the second year for a total of 1,236. In Year 3 there are 1,854, and so
on until Year 7, when 4,326 (i.e., 7 times 618) out of 4,404 programmers
have been selected using the PAT, and we assume the selection program is
ended. All of these 4,326 programmers stay for the remaining 3 years of
the la-year analysis. The increased leverage of the selection program
is substantial. Over the 10-year analysis, selection affects 31,282 person-
years of productivity (i.e., the sum of 618 plus 1,236 plus 1,854, and
so on) as noted in Table 6. This leverage concept is similar to the one
illustrated in Table 1 for training programs. Moreover, the selection
program's leverage over 10 years is far greater than the number of
programmers selected (i.e., 618 times 7, or 4,236).
utility computation. The utility values shown at the bottom of Table
6 were calculated by computing the cost-benefit consequences for each of
the ten years, and then summing them over all 10 years, adjusting for taxes,
variable costs and interest rates. Comparing these values to those in
Table 5 illustrates the substantial effects of re-applying the PAT as
subsequent cohorts of programmers are hired. Testing costs indeed rise
substantially to a discounted after-tax total of approximately $40,000.
Selection benefits, however, are now $54.32 million (i.e., the after-tax,
after-cost discounted sum of the productivity effects over 31,282 person-
years). The difference between the $54.32 million benefit and the $40,000
cost is $54.28 million in after-tax, after-cost discounted value (compared
to selecting randomly). This value is substantially greater than the $12.55
million reported in Table 3, primarily because of the increased leverage
gained by re-applying the selection program. Yet, human resource decision
makers seldom even compute a leverage figure, let alone trace its effects
on program costs and benefits.
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Dealing with uncertainty. Once again, break-even analysis can assist
with uncertainty. Again, suppose there was some disagreement and
uncertainty regarding the increased value per person-year produced by using
the PAT. The analysis above assumed it would equal $6,331 per person-year.
However, one might question the assumed validity increase of .76, or the
likelihood of hiring the top 50% of applicants, or the assumption that
the value of those selected remains constant over time and as new
programmers are added to the work force. We can express the relationship
between total utility and the increased value per person-year (sYmbolized
QUAL) as follows:
Utility (8,580 x QUAL) $40,000 (6)
where 8,580 equals the total benefit (i.e., $54.32 million) divided by
the work force value increase (i.e., $6,331 per person-year), and reflects
the 31,282 person-years of leverage as well as the financial considerations.
Applying break-even logic using this formula suggests that new-hire
value per must increase by only $4.66 per person-year (i.e., $40,000/8,580)
to break-even with the $40,000 discounted, after-tax testing costs. Once
again, though the particular utility value of $54.28 million may be highly
uncertain, break-even analysis suggests that the risk of producing an effect
small enough to render the PAT a poor investment may be quite low, because
the break-even necessary improvement in new-hire value is only $4.66 per
person-year. At the very least, such an analysis focuses debate on the
decision to be made, rather than the measurement details behind a particular
utility value. Moreover, because the relationships are mathematically
explicit, personal computer programs using spreadsheets or other types
of software can greatly reduce computational requirements.
utility Analysis Integrating Selection and Recruitment
utility Analysis: A New Perspective Page 37
Our analysis thus far has simply assumed that the same group of
applicants would be considered whether the new selection system is used
or not, but selection programs don't operate in a vacuum. They are affected
by characteristics of the applicant pool generated through recruitment
activities (Boudreau & Rynes, 1985). A stringent selection process will
still yield new hires of lower value if applied to poorly-qualified
applicants, and vice versa. So, the quality of new hires may be enhanced
through investments in improved recruitment (such as recruiting at better-
quality colleges), as well as investments in better selection. Even when
recruitment activities remain the same, changes in selection activities
can affect the applicant pool. For example, polygraph or drug tests might
actually reduce work force quality if better-qualified applicants find
them intrusive or insulting, and decide not to apply. When can changes
in selection strategies actually reduce work force value through their
effects on applicant pools? When are investments in improved recruitment
cost effective? How can investments in recruitment and selection be
integrated to create the highest combined return? Utility Model #4 (see
Table 2) addresses questions like these.
How The Multiple-Cohort External Recruitment and Selection utility Model
Works
The quantity of person-years in the recruitment-selection utility
model reflects the same flow of employees into and out of the work force
as assumed in the Financial Multiple-Cohort External Selection Utility
Model (Model #3 in Table 2). The costs now reflect not only selection,
but also and recruitment programs applied in each year of the analysis.
Finally, in this model, the quality of new hires is calculated based on
the average value of applicants in the pool (the value that would. be
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produced by a randomly-hired group of job applicants) plus the incremental
value added by selecting non-randomly from that applicant pool. Whereas
the utility values reflected in the three selection utility models discussed
previously reflected only the difference in work force value between
selecting systematically versus to randomly, the utility value calculated
by this Model #4 reflects the expected work force value of those hired
using the recruitment-selection system during the analysis period. This
value includes not only how well employees are selected from among the
applicant pool, but the value of that applicant pool is in the first place.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 7 Here
----------------------------------------
Applying the Model to the Case Situation
The second strategic question is: "Should the recruitment program
be changed to attract higher-quality applicants?" Table 7 applies the
recruitment-selection utility model to estimate the returns from using
the PAT in combination with one of two recruitment methods--recruitment
advertising or a recruitment agency. Recruitment advertising is assumed
to produce an applicant pool with diverse qualifications but a moderate
average applicant value, because recruitment advertising reaches a wide
audience but provides little pre-screening. The recruitment agency is
assumed to produce an applicant pool with less diverse qualifications but
a higher average applicant value, because the agency is expected to screen
applicants before referring them to the organization.
Table 7 shows the variables that don't change as a result of
recruitment (i.e., the number of new hires, tenure, number of applicants,
testing costs, average test score, and financial considerations). utility
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is assessed assuming the same 10-year application of the staffing program
and employee flow pattern discussed earlier.
Table 7 also shows the variables affected by recruitment.
Specifically, recruitment advertising costs $2,500 per hire, while the
recruitment agency costs $4,450 per hire (American Management Association,
1986, Table 55). Recruitment advertising is expected to produce an
applicant pool similar to the present one, so validity is .76 and SOy is
$10,413 as before. Because the recruitment agency is expected to screen
applicants more carefully, there will be less variability among them,
reducing validity to .60 and reducing SOy to $8,500 per person-year.
The advantage of the recruitment agency is in identifying an applicant
pool of higher quality. To reflect this advantage in Table 7, agency-
recruited applicants are assumed to have an average service value of $60,000
(due to pre-screening) offset by average service costs (including higher
salaries/benefits to attract and retain them) of $40,000 per person-year,
producing a net applicant value for agency-recruited applicants of $20,000
per person-year. The average service value per person-year for advertising-
recruited applicants is assumed to be $52,065 per person-year (lower than
agency-recruited applicants due to the lack of pre-screening), and is offset
by service costs of $36,445 per person-year, for a net applicant value
of $15,620 per person-year (somewhat lower than for agency-recruited
applicants) .
utility Computation
The expected value of each new hire is the sum of two values: (l)
the value produced by selecting randomly (i.e., hiring average-value
applicants) from the applicant pool, plus (2) the incremental value produced
by systematic selection from that pool. Thus, the average value of those
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hired through advertising is equal to the average value of the advertising-
generated applicants (i.e., $52,065 - $36,445 or $15,620 per person-year)
plus the incremental value produced by systematic selection using the PAT
(i.e., .76 times .80 times $10,413, or $6,331 per person-year), totalling
$21,951 per person-year. The value of those hired from the agency-generated
applicant pool is equal to the average value of the agency-generated
applicants (i.e., $60,000 - $40,000 or $20,000 per person-year) plus the
incremental value produced by systematic selection using the PAT (i.e.,
.60 times .80 times $8,500, or $4,080 per person-year), totalling $24,080
per person-year.
Once these quality levels are computed, we compute total utility
precisely as before in Table 6. That is, by multiplying average new-hire
quality by the number of new hires in the work force in each of the ten
years, summing over the ten-year analysis period, subtracting the total
selection and recruitment costs, and adjusting for the discount rate,
variable costs and taxes. Note that these computations were accomplished
using a personal computer with spreadsheet software programmed to reflect
the mathematical relationships.
The results are shown in Table 7. The after-tax, discounted Value
of Random Selection (i.e., hiring applicants of average value) from the
advertising-generated applicant pool is $141.04 million, with a recruiting
cost of $4.55 million. The after-tax, discounted Value of Random Selection
(i.e., hiring applicants of average value) from the agency-generated
applicant pool is higher ($180.50 million) but the costs are also higher
at $8.10 million. The value added by testing the advertising-generated
applicants is the same as before (i.e., $54.32 million incremental benefit
minus $40,000 testing cost). However, testing the agency-generated
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applicant pool adds less value (because they are already pre-screened),
producing incremental benefits of $35.00 million, with the same testing
cost of $40,000.
Considering only selection utility, we can see that the PAT pays off
under either recruiting strategy, but achieves a smaller payoff applied
to agency-generated applicants than to advertising-generated applicants
(i.e., $34.96 million versus $54.28 million). However, the recruitment-
selection utility model shows that the agency-generated applicant pool
produces a much higher average value than the advertising-generated
applicant pool (i.e., $180.5 million versus $141.04 million). When the
effects of recruitment and testing are integrated, the advantage of
combining agency recruiting with PAT selection is clear. Selecting agency
recruits with the PAT produces a total work force value of $207.45 million
(i.e., $34.96 million plus $172.4 million) compared to testing advertising
recruits, which produces a total work force value of $190.76 million (i.e.,
$54.28 million plus $136.48 million). Sacrificing some testing
effectiveness for an increase in average applicant quality makes sense.
By systematically integrating the cost-benefit implications of recruitment
and selection decisions, the recruitment-utility model identifies the
conditions that lead to this outcome. Of course, this utility model could
also be used to explore other implications of the recruitment-selection
relationship (Boudreau & Rynes, 1985).
Dealing With Uncertainty
Again, break-even analysis offers a method of addressing uncertainty
and risk. Suppose there was some doubt that agency-recruited applicants
would really average of $7,935 more service value per person-year (i.e.,
$60,000 minus $52,065) than those recruited through advertising. Agency
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recruiting costs more, agency recruits require higher service costs to
attract and retain them, and the PAT is less useful when applied to agency-
recruited applicants. Isn't it rather risky to switch to an agency when
you don't know the true difference in value between the applicants generated
by each recruitment method? One way to address this question is to
determine how much higher the average net value of agency-recruited
applicants would have to be in order to offset the increased recruiting
and salary costs, and the reduced testing effectiveness. Recruiting through
the agency instead of advertising increases recruitment costs by $3.55
million (i.e., $8.10 million minus $4.55 million) and reduces the selection
test's incremental value by $19.32 million (i.e., $54.32 million minus
$35.00 million), a total negative effect of $22.87 million.
The Value of Random Selection for advertising was $141.04 million
with an average net applicant value of $15,620 per person-year, while the
Value of Random Selection for agency recruiting was $180.50 million with
an average net applicant value of $20,000 per person-year. The Value of
Random Selection rose by $39.46 million (i.e., $180.5 million minus $141.04
million) when the average net applicant value rose by $4,380 (i.e., $20,000
minus $15,620) per person-year. Because all the other variables affecting
the Value of Random Selection are unaffected by recruitment, we can write
the formula for the Value of Random Selection as a function of the average
net value per person-year in the applicant pool as follows:
Value of Random Selection = (9,009x Net Value) (7)
Where 9,009 equals the change in the Value of Random Selection--$39.46
million divided by the change in net value per person-year in the applicant
pool--$4,380. If we solve this formula for the change in average net value
per person-year necessary to increase the Value of Random Selection by
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$22.87 million (enough to offset the negative effects of agency
recruitment), we obtain $2,538 per person-year (i.e., $22.87 divided by
9 , 009 ) . So, the agency-recruited applicants pool must have an average
net value of $18,158 (i.e., $15,620 plus $2,538) per person-year or more
to justify the more expensive agency recruiting effort. If our service
costs for agency-recruited applicants rise to $40,000 per person-year,
then their service value must be at least $58,158 (i.e., $40,000 plus
$18,158) per person-year to offset the negative effects of agency
recruitment. In the example, agency-recruited applicants had an assumed
average service value of $60,000 per person-year, producing a sizable
advantage for the agency recruitment method.
The complexity of the recruitment-selection utility underscores the
advantages of cost-benefit analysis in permitting calculations to be
computerized and in analyzing uncertainty systematically. Moreover, the
sizable effects shown in Table 7 suggest that adopting an integrated
approach to recruitment and selection programs may produce substantially
more valuable human resource decisions.
utility Analysis Integrating Recruitment, Selection and
Employee Separations/Retentions
Integrating recruitment and selection enhances the utility model and,
as we have seen, can improve staffing program decisions. However, decisions
about selection and recruitment programs affect and are affected by employee
separations. If improved selection produces better-qualified new hires
who leave sooner than less-qualified applicants, could the increased costs
of turnover nullify the advantages of improved recruitment-selection?
How much should an organization invest in programs designed to retain the
best performers, such as higher compensation or improved benefits? What
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is an "optimum" level of employee turnover, and how is it affected by
recruitment/selection programs? Should investments in improved
recruitment/selection be combined with investments in programs to
simultaneously retain the best performers? Answers to these questions
require analyzing not just the effects of employee acquisitions, but the
effects of employee separations (e.g., quits, resignations, layoffs) as
well. Model #5 (see Table 2) provides a framework for such analysis.
How the Financial Multiple-Cohort External Recruitment, Selection and
Separation/Retention Utility Model Works
We have assumed that each hired cohort simply stays for a number of
years (10 years in our example) and then leaves. This is more realistic
than focusing on only the first hired cohort, but it is still a vast
oversimplification of actual separation patterns. Hired employees don't
actually stay together in one group, and then leave together. Rather,
during each time period those leaving may include new, old, good or bad
employees. HRM decisions and programs affect the pattern of separations,
which in turn affects the value of the retained work force. This is true
for both selection/recruitment programs and programs designed to manage
employee separations more directly (Boudreau & Berger, 1985b).
Model #5 considers the effects of separations on work force value;
But rather than focusing on who is lost, the model focuses on who is
retained. Consider the group of job incumbents before separations (the
pre-separation work force) as a pool of employees with a certain average
value to the organization. When employees separate, a subset of the
incumbent pool stays with the organization. If more valuable employees
separate, the retained work force value is lower than the pre-separation
work force value, and vice versa. Thus, we can analyze how employee
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separations/retentions affect work force quality by calculating the quality
(i.e., average net value per person-year) of the retained work force in
each time period under different assumptions about who is retained. The
cost of employee separation/retentions includes the cost of the separations
themselves (e.g., exit interviews or severance pay) as well as the costs
of programs designed to affect the pattern of separations (e.g., retirement
incentives). The quantity of person-years affected by
separations/retentions is the number of employees and time periods involved
in the analysis. Decisions and programs that tend to retain more valuable
employees produce higher work force value, and vice versa.
To integrate employee separations/retentions with recruitment and
selection, we simply consider the effects of recruitment/selection on the
value of employees added to the work force, and then the effects of employee
separations/retentions on the value of employees who are retained. Briefly,
in any given time period, the value of the work force consists of (1) the
quantity of employees retained times their average quality, plus (2) the
quantity of employees added times their average quality, minus (3) the
costs of acquiring the new employees (recruitment/selection costs) and
releasing the separating employees (separation/retention costs). The
utility model sums the work force values in each time period, adjusting
for taxes, variable costs and the discount rate.
In concept, separation/retention is similar to recruitment/selection.
Recruitment/selection begins with an applicant pool from which certain
individuals are chosen to join the organization. Separation/retention
begins with an incumbent work force from which certain individuals are
retained by the organization. Such systematic retention is quite apparent
in layoff or dismissal decisions, where the organization decides who leaves
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and who stays. The concept also applies, although perhaps less apparently,
when employees do the choosing (e.g., in the case of quits or resignations).
Here, those who remain are not directly "chosen," but HRM decisions (such
as competitive compensation for star performers or pension rights that
vest only after extended tenure) are certainly intended to manage these
separations.
Application to the Case Situation
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 8 Here
----------------------------------------
The third strategic question asks: "Should the pattern of employee
separations be changed to retain more of the good performers, and how much
would such a change be worth?" Table 8 applies the Financial Multiple-
Cohort External Recruitment Selection and Separation/Retention Utility
Model (Model #5 in Table 2) to address this question (a similar application
is discussed in detail in Boudreau & Berger, 1985b). The number of
acquisitions and separations is still 618 and the number of programmers
is still 4,404. The financial/economic considerations remain the same,
and the analysis period is still 10 years.
Table 8 assumes recruitment through advertising, so the selection
and recruitment parameters reflect the assumptions corresponding to
recruitment advertising in Table 7. The PAT has an assumed validity of
.76, and the number of applicants, standard test score, testing cost,
average applicant service value, average applicant service cost, and SDy
remain the same as before. Each group of 618 acquisitions has an average
value of $21,951 per person-year. This is the sum of the value of random
selection (i.e., $15,620 per person-year) plus the incremental value added
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by systematic selection (i.e., $6,331 per person-year).
Based on a review of costing literature, Boudreau & Berger (1985b)
derived a cost of $7,000 for each acquisition (reflecting such things as
the $2,500 recruitment cost, relocation, orientation, and administrative
activity) and $7,000 for each separation (reflecting administrative
activity, outplacement assistance, exit interviews, and severance pay).
Such costs are incurred regardless of the quality of the person joining
or leaving. At the beginning of the analysis, we assume the work force
resembles the applicant population (i.e., average yearly incumbent service
value is $52,065 and average yearly incumbent service cost is $36,045 for
a net value of $15,620 per person-year).
These assumptions establish all the information needed except the
pattern of separations. The separation pattern determines whether the
organization keeps its better or poorer performers. Table 8 analyzes four
contrasting situations: (1) random selection and retention; (2) valid
selection with random retention, where those retained have the same average
value as the pre-separation work force; (3) valid selection while retaining
the best, where those retained have an average yearly value of $2,707
greater than the pre-separation work force; and (4) valid selection while
retaining the worst, where those retained have an average yearly value
of $2,707 less than the pre-separation work force.
utility Computation
The results of the four selection and retention combinations are shown
at the bottom of Table 8. Though the computations required to generate
these values are complex, they were computed using a LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheet
model reflecting the algebraic logic of the acquisition and separation
utility model (Boudreau, 1985). Computerization greatly reduced the
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calculation effort, and simplified the analysis. Under Option 1, where
the organization experiences random selection (validity of zero) and random
retention (zero separation effect), it will have a 10-year after-tax, after-
cost discounted work force value of $200.31 million. Under Option 2, where
valid selection (validity equals .76) is introduced and retentions remain
random, the work force value increases to $242.10 million over ten years.
Option 3 shows that if the organization has high validity and also retains
the best employees (i.e., those retained are $2,707 more valuable per
person-year than the per-separation work force), it will attain the highest
work force value of $351.69 million. Finally, Option 4 shows that even
with highly-valid selection, if the worst employees are retained (i.e.,
the effect of separations is to lower the average programmer value by $2,707
per person-year), producing a low 10-year work force value of $132.50
million.
The interaction between separation and acquisition patterns has some
important implications. If decision makers considered only the effects
of valid selection, they would expect a $41.79 million dollar increase
in work force value compared to random selection (i.e., $242.10 million
minus $200.31 million). However, if improved selection is combined with
improved retention, an additional $109.59 million could be realized (i.e.,
$351.69 million minus $242.10 million). By the same token, dysfunctional
retention patterns can disrupt the effects of improved selection, as
illustrated by the fact that valid selection combined with retaining the
worst employees produces a work force value $67.81 million lower than random
selection and retention. While these effects are based on a specific set
of assumptions, they suggest that integrating human resource programs
affecting selection and retention may produce substantial organizational
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benefits.
Dealing with Uncertainty
The analysis in Table 8 shows that the highest value from improved
selection is achieved when the best employees are retained. Work force
value is $242.10 million when the separation effect is zero, $351.69 million
when the separation effect is $2,707 per person-year, and $132.50 million
when the separation effect is -$2,707 per person-year. Thus, work force
value changes by $109.6 million for each change of $2,707 in the Separation
Effect. This suggests the following relationship between changes in the
separation effect and total work force value:
Work force Value 40,488 x Separation Effect (8)
where 40,488 equals $109.6 million divided by $2,707. Simply put, every
dollar increase in the difference between the average value of the retained
work force and the average value of the pre-separation work force is worth
$40,488 in discounted, after-tax, after cost value over 10 years.
Suppose managers disagreed about the likely effect of improved
selection on the separation pattern. If the current selection and
separation pattern is random with respect to job performance, then better
selection will cause better-qualified employees to be hired. However,
if better-selected employees are more likely to leave (e.g., due to better
job opportunities), could this reduce the value of the work force enough
to offset the selection improvement? Taking the difference between the
Total Work force Value for Options 1 and 2 suggests that improved selection
produces an additional work force value of $41.79 million (i.e., $242.10
million - $200.31 million), assuming the separation pattern remains random.
Solving Equation 8 for the Separation Effect necessary to reduce Work force
Utility by -$41.79 produces a break-even Separation Effect of -$1,032 per
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person-year (i.e., -$41.79 million/$40,488). As long as improved selection
causes a separation pattern where the retained work force value is greater
than the pre-separation work force value minus $1,032 per person-year,
then improved selection will produce a higher total work force value than
random selection with random retention. Thus, using Model #5 does not
require that we be certain of the value of the Separation Effect. In fact,
it enables us to more precisely trace the implications of our uncertainty
by making more explicit the relationships between recruitment, selection
and separation/retentions.
Clearly, it is not enough for recruitment to simply fill all vacancies,
for selection to appear valid, or for the turnover rate to be comparable
with others in the industry. It is the patterns of employee acquisitions
and separations, expressed in terms of quantity, quality and cost that
produces results. The integrated utility model provides a framework for
considering how these patterns and relationships can produce substantial
improvements in work force value and organizational performance.
utility Analysis Integrating Internal and External staffing Decisions
The separation-retention utility model integrates selection,
recruitment and employee separations/retentions, but it still leaves an
important gap--it deals with only one job. Decisions that affect selection
and separation in one job often affect and are affected by how employees
move between jobs within the organization. If you select and retain highly-
qualified employees in lower-level jobs do they also make good promotion
candidates, or does their narrow focus makes them poor performers in upper-
level jobs? When is it better to select employees based on their potential
to perform in higher-level jobs rather than their qualifications for entry-
level jobs? If you promote your best technical performers into management,
Utility Analysis: A New Perspective Page 51
are you decreasing work force value by reducing valuable technical
performance or building organizational value with strong technical managers?
External and internal staffing are closely linked. The pool of
promotion candidates is partially determined by external hiring and
separation. Downsizing may involve layoffs, but it also often involves
some redeployment or rebalancing in job assignments by moving employees
between jobs. Moreover, internal staffing is important independent of
external staffing. Organizations devote substantial time and resources
to promotions, demotions and transfers, even if no external staffing takes
place. The final utility model (Model #6 in Table 2) presents a framework
for integrating the consequences of decisions that affect not only how
employees enter and leave the work force, but how they move between jobs.
How the Financial Multiple-Cohort Internal/External Recruitment, Selection,
and Separation/Retention utility Model Works
Internal staffing involves employees moving between jobs within the
organization, and includes promotions, demotions and transfers (Boudreau
& Berger, 1985a). Human resource planning has focused on the quantity
of internal movements between jobs (Milkovich & Anderson, 1982) using Markov
or other models to predict this quantity (e.g., Anderson, Milkovich & Tsui,
1981; Rosenbaum, 1984; Stewman & Konda, 1983). Such planning identifies
gaps between desired and projected quantities of employees in various jobs.
Some have recognized that internal movements affect the efficient allocation
of labor resources (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Thurow, 1980), but did
not propose a framework for analyzing the productivity consequences of
internal movements. A decision model for internal employee movements should
consider the effects of internal staffing not only on the quantity of
employees, but on their quality and cost as well (Boudreau, 1987b).
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For jobs that receive employees, internal movement is very much like
external selection, except that the "applicant pool" consists of candidates
currently employed, whose characteristics will be determined in part by
their current and previous work experience in the organization. Whereas
external selection decisions might use test scores to predict future
performance, internal selection decisions might consider seniority,
performance or assessment center scores.
For jobs that supply employees, the effect of internal movements are
similar to external separation/retention, except that the pattern of
separations is determined by internal staffing decisions, instead of by
dismissals, layoffs or quits. Internal staffing decisions usually emphasize
ensuring that vacancies in the receiving job are filled with qualified
candidates. Yet, as we shall see, the effects of internal movements on
the jobs that supply candidates can be as serious as employee separations,
and may not always be offset by improved performance in the receiving job.
In the utility model, the value of the work force in any job at a
particular time is a function of: (1) the quantity times the quality of
employees retained when external separations take place, plus (2) the
quantity times the quality of employees added through external
recruitment/selection, plus (3) the quantity times the quality of employees
retained when internal separations take place (i.e., employees move out
of the job into other jobs); plus (4) the quantity times the quality of
employees added through internal selection; minus (5) the costs of external
and internal selection and separation activities. The model establishes
the value of the work force in each job at the beginning of the analysis,
and then changes that value in each time period to reflect the effects
of internal and external employee movements. The resulting utility value
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is the sum of the work force values in the jobs analyzed during the time
period analyzed, adjusted for taxes, interest rates, and variable costs.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 9 Here
----------------------------------------
Application to the Case Situation
Question #4 asks whether investing in an assessment center for internal
promotions is cost-effective. Table 9 presents the results of applying
the Financial Multiple-Cohort Internal/External Recruitment, Selection
and Separation/Retention utility Model to the current example. In Table
9, the external staffing variables for the Programmer job are the same
as before, except that instead of 618 new hires to replace external
separations, we now have 718 new hires necessary to replace the 618
separations and the 100 promotions. The financial considerations and 10-
year analysis period are the same for both jobs.
For illustration, we will consider the effects of internal promotions
into a Data System Manager job containing 1,000 upper-level employees,
100 of whom leave the organization each year. A promotion-from-within
policy exists, and the 100 vacancies are filled by promoting 100
Programmers. Each separation from the Manager job costs $8,000, slightly
higher than the $7,000 cost for Programmers, regardless of the quality
of those retained. Each promotion from Programmer to Manager also costs
$8,000 (including relocation, orientation and administration). Internal
selection is accomplished with an assessment center, costing an average
of $380 per tested applicant (Cascio & Silbey, 1979), producing a total
cost of $1.44 million per year to assess all 3,786 promotion candidates.
Notice the symmetry between the external staffing variables considered
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in the Programmer job and the internal staffing variables considered in
the Manager job. The "applicant pool" for promotions is the group of 3,786
Programmers available in each year after external separations take place
(i.e., 4,404 minus 618 equals 3,786). With 3,786 applicants for 100 job
openings, the organization can be quite choosy, so the average standard
test score of those promoted is 2.32 SD (standard deviations) above average.
This assumes that all Programmers are promotion candidates, but one could
easily consider situations in which only a limited number of Programmers
are eligible or tested. Performance differences are assumed to have larger
consequences in the Manager job than in the Programmer job, so SDy among
promotion candidates is $11,454 (about ten percent higher than the $10,413
SDy for Programmer applicants).
Because the Manager job involves more discretion and responsibility
than the programmer job, the average service value of Programmers promoted
to Manager (i.e., the value obtained with random promotions) is assumed
to be ten percent higher than they produced as Programmers. Their average
service cost also rises by ten percent when promoted, reflecting higher
salaries. As the value of the Programmer work force is increased (through
valid external selection and beneficial separations and retentions), the
value of the Programmers as promotion candidates also increases. Thus,
decisions that improve the Programmer work force produce an added benefit
by improving promotion candidates for Manager jobs, and vice versa. The
model could also reflect smaller or larger relationships between Programmer
and Manager performance.
utility Computation
The bottom of Table 9 shows the effects of different internal and
external staffing patterns. The values shown represent the after-tax,
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after-cost discounted value of the Programmer and Manager work forces,
summed over the 10-year analysis period. While the computations are rather
complex, the mathematical utility model is explicit enough to allow them
to be programmed using a personal computer with spreadsheet software.
The values in Table 9 were generated using such a spreadsheet program
(Boudreau, 1987a).
Option 1 depicts random external and internal staffing. Under such
a system, the average value of each job's work force remains constant as
internal and external movement occur, producing a total 10-year value of
$249.86 million. Option 2 introduces valid external selection using the
PAT with a validity of .76. The value of Programmers is enhanced, and
this enhances the value of the Manager work force when the Programmers
are promoted, producing a total work force value of $296.90 million. Option
3 analyzes internal staffing in the typical manner. It acknowledges the
validity of the assessment center (validity equal to .35) for the Manager
job, but it still assumes that promoting highly-qualified Programmers has
no effect on the quality of the Programmer work force. Under these
assumptions, total work force value increases to $302.51 million. Option
4 considers the possibility that promoting highly-qualified Programmers
pulls high performers from the Programmers work force, reducing the average
value of the retained Programmers by $625 per person-year, producing a
total work force utility of $278.68 million. Though the assessment center
validly predicts future job performance for Managers, if it simultaneously
removes high-performing Programmers the organization would be $12.22 million
better off with random internal staffing (Option 2).
This is not to suggest that assessment centers are always poor
investments, but it illustrates the value of a decision framework
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incorporating the effects of internal staffing decisions on the jobs that
supply employees as well as the jobs that receive employees. It also
illustrates the limits of internal staffing models that consider only
movement quantities or head count levels. Despite the fact that the
quantities of employee movements were constant across the four options,
substantial differences in work force value emerged. These concepts can
be extended to encompass other decisions affecting internal and external
employee flows, such as "make-or-buy" decisions between internal and
external selection, reductions in work force size, and systems involving
more than two jobs.
Dealing With Uncertainty
Model #6 represents the most integrative utility framework,
encompassing both internal and external recruitment, selection and
separation/retention, as well as financial investment factors. Obviously,
utility values based on such a model require estimates, and such estimates
may be uncertain or variable. As with the earlier utility models, break-
even analysis can address such uncertainty systematically and explicitly.
For example, Table 9 showed that when assessment-center-based internal
promotions cause a reduction in average Programmer value of $625 per person-
year, the $5.61 million advantage of better internal selection (i.e.,
$302.51 million in Option #3 minus $296.90 million in Option #2) is offset
by productivity losses in the Programmer job. However, the $625 figure
may be uncertain or controversial. Some might argue that while assessment
center selection will CaUse some reduction in the value of the 3,686
Programmers who remain after promotions, it would not be $625 per person-
year. How much less would the productivity reduction have to be change
the decision in favor of the Assessment Center?
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The results of Options 3 and 4 in Table 9 suggest that the when the
Programmer Promotion Effect (the difference in average value between the
pre-promotion work force and the retained work force after promotions)
changes from zero to -$625, the Total Work force Value changes by -$23.83
million. Therefore, every dollar change in the Programmer Promotion Effect
causes a change in Total Work force Value of $38,128 (i.e., $23.83
million/625) . Knowing this, we can find the Programmer Promotion Effect
that would exactly offset the $5.61 million advantage of improved Programmer
selection by dividing -$5.61 million by $38,128. This produces a Programmer
Promotion Effect of -$147 per person-year. If promoting the highest-
qualified programmers reduces the Programmer work force value by $147 per
person-year or more, the total work force value would be less than $296.90
million obtained with random promotions and retentions. Addressing the
controversy does not require precisely measuring the Programmer Promotion
Effect, but rather determining whether it exceeds the critical value that
could change the decision to adopt the assessment center (i.e., -$147 in
this example). The utility model focuses the analysis on the critical
question of how Assessment Center based promotions affect the programmer
work force.
SUIIIna.ry and Implications
Summary
This chapter has illustrated how cost-benefit utility analysis models
can systematically analyze the productivity effects of human resource
programs. The training program application (Table 1) illustrated utility
analysis for programs affecting the stock of employees. For employee flows,
Models #1 through #6 in Table 2 and their application to the case study
(Tables 3 through 9) showed how cost-benefit analysis can encompass not
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only the relatively simple case of selecting one cohort, but the integrated
effects of external selection, employee separations and internal employee
movements between jobs. Note that it is also possible to integrate the
utility model for employee stocks with the models for employee flows.
The break-even analysis demonstrated that precise parameter measurement
may be less important than commonly believed. The important task is to
identify the critical values for those variables that could affect the
human resource decision and systematically assess their implications for
risk and uncertainty. Then, measurement effort can proceed with a definite
goal. The contribution of utility analysis is its ability to make explicit
the relationships linking human resource decisions to productivity-related
outcomes, and to highlight the critical assumptions and areas of uncertainty
for systematic analysis.
Decision Systems Are Planning Tools
utility analysis models offer a way to summarize and integrate a large
number of productivity-related consequences, that might otherwise be ignored
or incorrectly evaluated. As we have seen, such summaries and integration
are not limited to evaluating programs that have already been implemented.
Rather, they offer a framework for planning human resource programs and
activities. The way human resource decisions are planned, communicated
and evaluated is likely to affect how such decisions are perceived by
managers throughout the organization, and whether they are implemented.
Utility analysis offers a framework that focuses explicitly and
systematically on productivity-related consequences.
However, productivity-related consequences are only one consideration
in human resource decisions. Several constituents must be considered by
decision makers, including not only managers concerned with productivity
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but employees, regulatory agencies, and communities. Furthermore,
organizations are never completely rational. Politics, personalities,
tradition and power often determine the outcomes of decisions and programs'
success or failure (Milkovich & Boudreau, 1988, Chapter 8). still, utility
analysis models summarize productivity-related outcomes, and can assist
decision makers to more systematically consider the tradeoffs between
productivity and other less tangible factors. Though it will never be
easy to balance a potential million-dollar return against possible negative
effects on employee morale, legal vulnerability or union animosity, the
task may be easier when productivity consequences are better specified.
At least, decision makers will be operating from a common data set that
can more appropriately address important organizational concerns.
Limited Information is No Excuse for Unsystematic Decisions
Every management function operates with uncertainty, yet dollar costs
and returns are routinely considered in such decisions. Believing that
"people problems" are simply too uncertain to stand up to rigorous analysis
provides a convenient excuse to avoid it, but the examples presented here
illustrate that it can also lead to unsystematic and incorrect decisions.
Moreover, such a belief may create the impression that human resource
management produces only "soft" benefits to the organization.
Utility analysis encourages decision makers to identify sources of
risk or uncertainty and examine their effects on decisions, rather than
attempting to precisely measure every variable. Techniques such as break-
even analysis and computer-assisted "what if ..." analysis are as applicable
to decisions about human resources as they are to decisions about financial,
marketing or operational resources. As we have seen, such techniques often
clarify the nature of uncertainty and can actually enhance decisions by
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demonstrating that only very unlikely events could make human resource
programs unprofitable.
Human Resource Decisions Are Management Decisions
Though the contributions and importance of human resource decisions
are often acknowledged abstractly (as in the common statement that "our
people are our most important asset"), day-to-day decisions by line and
top managers often belie this sentiment. Human resource programs are often
the first to be cut to reduce budgets, managers often consider only the
costs of programs or employee behaviors, and the substantial leverage of
human resource decisions that affect large numbers of employees and time
periods is often ignored.
If there is one overwhelming message from the illustrations presented
here, it is that human resource decisions can make a difference to
organizational productivity, and that these decisions can be analyzed
systematically and explicitly. Organizational decisions often are
ultimately made by supervisors, line managers and top management. This
is as true for human resources as it is for marketing, production and
financial resources. If human resource professionals are to influence
these managers, they must demonstrate that human resource issues can be
analyzed within a management framework, and that such analysis provides
essential and important information. utility analysis models provide a
starting point.
Ignoring human resource implications, or adopting convenient but faulty
decision systems is a dangerous gamble that can cost millions. This is
not a startling or surprising conclusion, it is a logical consequence of
viewing human resource decisions within the framework of quantity, quality
and cost that applies to any management decision. In many cases, simply
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framing human resource issues in these terms clarifies their importance
and directs managers toward better decisions (Florin-Thuma & Boudreau,
in press). Actual decisions will involve different assumptions from those
used here for illustration, but the principles illustrated by these examples
provide a useful and general decision system. A long-term integrated
research program is currently underway to further enhance the utility
models, develop improved decision support tools using computers, and explore
how such models affect actual managerial decisions (Boudreau, Dyer & Rynes,
1986).
It is hoped that HRM decision makers will analyze and present their
decisions using cost-benefit and utility concepts; communicate better with
supervisors, line managers and top managers; make more effective HRM
decisions; and contribute more to organizational productivity and
competitiveness. Those who fail to employ these concepts may have no one
but themselves to blame when supervisors, line managers and top managers
continue to ignore human resource management's contribution.
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Table 1. utility and Break-Even Analysis Applied to Decisions Affecting
Employee stocks: A Training Delivery Decision.
Decision
Should training for engineers in basic production processes be delivered
through: (1) Classroom-based training, with twenty half-day sessions, class
sizes of 40, conducted by experienced engineering employees, training up
to 40 students per year; or (2) An Audio-Video network, consisting of one
broadcast studio and 10 remote conference rooms (one-way video, two-way
audio), allowing up to 200 to be trained per year
Option 1
Classroom Delivery
Option 2
Audio-Video Delivery
Costs: $451,035 over five years
(no start-up costs because
system already exists).
$1,031,147 over five
years (very high start-
up costs).
Quantity: Train 40 students per year Train 200 incumbents
in the first year, and
20 new hires in Years
2 through 5.
Number of Trained Employees in the Work Force (Leverage)
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Totals
40
80
120
160
200
600
200
220
240
260
280
1,200
Quality: Dollar Value of the increase
in productivity due to
classroom training, per
person-year (Symbolized P1).
Dollar Value of the increase
in productivity due to
Audio-Video training, per
person-year (Symbolized P2).
Payoff Formulas
u1 = (600 X P1) - $451,035 u2 = (1,200 X P2) - $1,031,147
Break-Even Analysis
P1 $451,035/600 = $752 P2 = $1,031,147/1,200 = $860
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Table 1. utility and Break-Even Analysis Applied to Decisions Affecting
Employee stocks: A Training Delivery Decision. (Concluded)
Payoff Formula for the Difference
U2 - U1 (1,200 X P2) - (600 X P1) - ($1,031,147 - $451,035)
[P2 - (.5 X P1)] - $484
Decision Rules
1.
2.
3.
If both P1 and P2 are less than break-even, do neither program.
If P1 exceeds $752, and P2 is less than (.5 X P1) + $484, do Option 1.
If P2 exceeds $860, and P2 is more than (.5 X P1) + $484, do Option 2.
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Summary of Cost-Benefit Decision Models for Employee Flows
Decision Model
Model #1:
One-Cohort External
Selection utility Model
(Schmidt, et al., 1979)
Model #2:
Financial One-Cohort
External Selection
utility Model
(Boudreau, 1983a)
Model #3
Financial
Multiple-Cohort
External Selection
utility Model
(Boudreau, 1983b)
Model #4
Financial
Multiple-Cohort
External Recruitment
and Selection
utility Model
(Boudreau & Rynes,
1985)
Model #5
Financial
Multiple-Cohort
External Recruitment,
Selection, and
Separation/Retention
utility Model
(Boudreau & Berger,
1985).
Added Features
Effects of taxes,
interest rates, and
costs of maintaining
and improving employee
performance.
Effects of re-applying
the selection program
to subsequent applicant
groups.
Effects of recruitment
decisions on the
outcomes of selection,
and vice versa.
Effects of employee
separation/retention
patterns on recruitment
and selection, and vice
versa.
Decision Addressed by
the Model
Deciding how to choose
which external applicants
should be hired in a
particular time period.
Financial value of
deciding how to choose
which external applicants
should be hired in a
particular time period.
Financial Value of
deciding how to choose
which external applicants
should be hired in each
future time period during
which a selection program
is applied.
Financial value of
deciding how to attract
the applicant pool,
as well as how to choose
which external applicants
should be hired in each
future time period during
which recruitment and
selection programs are
applied.
Financial value of
deciding how to attract
the applicant pool,
how to choose which
external applicants
should be hired, and
how to manage employee
separations/retentions
during each future time
period during which
recruitment, selection
and separation management
programs are applied.
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Table 2.
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Summary of Cost-Benefit Decision Models for Employee Flows
(Concluded)
Decision Model
Model #6:
Financial
Multiple-Cohort
Internal/External
Recruitment,
Selection, and
Separation/Retention
utility Model
(Boudreau, 1987b)
Added Features
Effects of recruitment,
selection and
separation/retention
of employees moving
between jobs within
the organization on
external staffing
decisions, and vice
versa.
Decision Addressed by
the Model
Financial value of
deciding how to attract
the applicant pool,
how to choose which
external applicants
should be hired, and
how to manage employee
separations/retentions
from the organization;
as well as how to
attract, choose and
manage separations when
employees move between
jobs within the
organization, during
each future time period
in which
internal/external
recruitment, selection
and separation management
programs are applied.
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Table 3. Situation to be Analyzed
Cost-Benefit
Information
Entry-Level Computer
Programmers
Upper-Level Data System
Manager
Current Employment
Number Separating
Number Selected
Number Promoted
4,404
618
718
100
1,000
100
0
100
Adapted from:
(1987b) .
Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie & Muldrow (1979) and Boudreau
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Table 4. One-Cohort External Selection utility Model
Cost-Benefit
Information
Current Employment
Number Separating
Number selected
Average Tenure
Number of Applicants
Average Test Score
SO of Applicant Value
(SOy)
Abili ty Test
Validi ty
Testing Cost
One-Cohort utility
Increase over Random
Selection without the
PAT
Entry-Level Computer
Programmers
4,404
618
618
9.69 years
1,236
.80 SO
$10,413/yr.
.76
$10/applicant
$37.9 million
Adapted from: Schmidt, Hunter, McKenzie, & Muldrow (1979).
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Table 5. Financial One-Cohort Entry-Level Selection Utility Model
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Cost-Benefit
Information
Current Employment
Number Separating
Number Selected
Average Tenure
Number of Applicants
Average Test Score
SD of Applicant Value
(SDy)
Variable Costs
Corporate Tax Rate
Corporate Interest Rate
Abili ty Test
Validi ty
Testing Cost
After-Cost, After Tax,
Discounted, One-Cohort
utility Increase over
Random Selection Without
the PAT.
Entry-Level Computer
Programmers
4,404
618
618
10 years
1,236
.80 SD
$10, 413/yr.
5%
45%
10%
.76
$10/applicant
$12.55 million
Adapted from: Boudreau (1983a).
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Table 6. Financial Multiple-Cohort External Selection utility Model
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Cost-Benefit
Information
Current Employment
Number Separating
Number Selected
Average Tenure
Number of Applicants
Average Test Score
SD of Applicant Value
(SDy)
Variable Costs
Corporate Tax Rate
Corporate Interest Rate
Analysis Period
Test Application Period
Person-Years Affected
Abili ty Test
Validity
Testing Cost
After-Cost, After Tax,
Discounted utility
Increase over Random
Selection Without the
PAT (Millions)
Entry-Level Computer
Programmers
4,404
618
618
10 years
1,236
.80 SD
$10 ,413/yr.
5%
45%
10%
10 years
7 years
31,282
.76
$10/applicant
Benefit - Cost
$54.32 - $.04
= $54.28
Adapted from: Boudreau (1983b).
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Table 7. Financial Multiple-Cohort External Recruitment and Selection
utility Model
Cost-Benefit
Information
Entry-Level Computer
Programmers
Current Employment
Number Separating
Number Selected
4,404
618
618
Average Tenure
Number of Applicants
Average Test Score
10 years
1,236
.80 SD
Variable Costs
Corporate Tax Rate
Corporate Interest Rate
5%
45%
10%
Test Application Period
Person-Years Affected
Analysis Period
7 years
31,282
10 years
Work force utility Results
Staffing Variable Recruitment Advert. Recruitment Agency
Ability Test Validity
Testing Cost
.76
$10japplicant
.60
$10japplicant
Recruitment Cost/Hire
Avg. Applicant Service Value
Avg. Applicant Service Cost
Avg. Net Applicant Value
SD of Applicant Value
(sn")
$ 2,500
$52,065
$36,445
$15,620
$10,413
$ 4,450
$60,000
$40,000
$20,000
$ 8,500
Value of Random Selection
Cost of Random Selection
Value Added by Testing
Cost Added by Testing
$141.04
-$ 4.55
$ 54.32
-$ 0.04
$180.50
-$ 8.10
$ 35.00
-$ .04
Total After-Tax, After-Cost
Discounted Work force Value
(Millions) $190.76 $207.45
Adapted from: Boudreau & Rynes (1985).
Work force utility Results
Staffing Variable Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Test Validity 0.00 0 .76 0 .76 0 .76
Separation Effect $0 $0 $2,707 -$2,707
After-Tax, After-Cost
Discounted Work force
Value (Millions) $200.31 $242.10 $351. 69 $132.50
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Table 8. Financial Multiple-Cohort External Recruitment, Selection and
Separation/Retention utility Model
Cost-Benefit
Information
Current Employment
Beginning Average
Service Value
Beginning Average
Service Cost
Number Separating
Number Selected
Acquisition Cost
Separation Cost
Number of Applicants
Average Applicant
Service Value
Average Applicant
Service Cost
Average Test Score
SO of Applicant Value
(SOy)
Testing Cost
Variable Costs
Corporate Tax Rate
Corporate Interest Rate
Analysis Period
Entry-Level Computer
prograrmners
4,404
$52,065
$36,445
618
618
$7,000
$7,000
1,236
$52,065/year
$35,445/year
.80 SO
$10,413/yr.
$10/applicant
5%
45%
10%
10 years
Adapted from: Boudreau & Berger (1985a).
Cost-Benefit Entry-Level Computer Upper-Level Data System
Information Programmers Managers
Current Employment 4,404 1,000
Beginning Average
Service Value $52,065 $57,272
Beginning Average
Service Cost $36,445 $40,000
Number Separating 618 100
Number Selected 718 0
Number Promoted 100 100
Acquisition Cost $7,000 NA
Separation Cost $7,000 $8,000
Promotion Cost NA $8,000
Number of Applicants 1,436 3,786
Average Applicant
Service Value $52,065/yr. 1.10 times average
Programmer value
Average Applicant
Service Cost $36,445/yr. 1.10 times average
Programmer cost
Average Test Score .80 SD 2.32 SD
SD of Applicant Value $10 ,413/yr. $11,454/yr.
(SDy)
Testing Cost $10/ applicant NA
Assessment Center Cost NA $1.44 million/yr.
Variable Costs 5% 5%
Corporate Tax Rate 45% 45%
Corporate Interest Rate 10% 10%
Analysis Period 10 years 10 Years
HRM Activity 1 2 3 4
Programmer Selection Validity 0.00 0.76 0.76 0.76
Programmer Promotion Effect $0 $0 $0 -$625
Manager Promotion Validity 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.35
After-Cost, After-Tax,
Discounted Total Work force
Value (Millions) $249.86 $296.90 $302.51 $278.68
Adapted from: Boudreau (1987b).
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Table 9. Financial Multiple-Cohort Internal/External Recruitment, Selection,
and Separation/Retention utility Model
Total Work force Utility Results
Options
